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INTRODUCTION 
In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court, for 
the first time, decided a case involving dilution under the Federal 
 
*  Professor of Computer Information Systems and Law, Stetson School of Business 
and Economics, Mercer University, Atlanta, Georgia. 
1 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). 
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Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).2  The Court held that the 
language of the FTDA unambiguously required a showing of 
actual dilution, rather than a mere likelihood of dilution.3  This 
ruling will significantly impact all dilution claims under the FTDA 
involving trademark parodies.  Part I of this Article will examine 
the Moseley decision.  Part II will explore the history of trademark 
parodies.  Part III will discuss the ramifications of Moseley on 
future trademark parody cases. 
I. THE MOSELEY CASE 
Shortly after Victor and Cathy Moseley opened Victor’s 
Secret, a retail store selling lingerie and adult novelties, they 
received a request from Victoria’s Secret, a well-known women’s 
lingerie retailer, to change the name of their store.4  Victoria’s 
Secret asserted that it was likely to cause confusion and dilute the 
distinctiveness of the Victoria’s Secret trademark.5  The Moseleys 
then changed their store’s name to Victor’s Little Secret.6  
Unsatisfied by the variation, Victoria’s Secret sued the Moseleys 
for (1) federal trademark infringement, (2) federal unfair 
competition, (3) federal trademark dilution under the FTDA, and 
(4) trademark infringement and unfair competition under Kentucky 
law.7  The district court granted the Moseleys’ motion for 
summary judgment on the federal and state infringement and 
unfair competition claims, finding that no likelihood of confusion 
 
2 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).  In pertinent part, Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
[FTDA] provides: 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of 
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction 
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, 
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark . . . . 
Id. § 1125(c)(1). 
3 Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124. 
4 See id. at 1119. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 465 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 
123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). 
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existed between the parties’ marks.8  It granted summary judgment 
in favor of Victoria’s Secret, however, on the dilution claim, 
finding that the Moseleys’ mark was sufficiently similar to cause 
dilution and diluted Victoria’s Secret’s mark by tarnishment.9 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for 
Victoria’s Secret on the dilution claim,10 addressing two factors 
that had not been discussed by the district court.11  The court noted 
that two months after the district court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit 
had adopted the Second Circuit’s standards for determining federal 
dilution,12 introducing two important considerations: whether 
Victoria’s Secret’s mark was distinctive in addition to being 
famous,13 and whether the Moseleys’ use of their mark had caused 
dilution of the distinctive quality of Victoria’s Secret’s mark.14  
Regarding the first issue, the court concluded that the Victoria’s 
Secret mark was distinctive and “deserving of a high level of 
trademark protection” because it was “‘arbitrary and fanciful.’”15  
With respect to the second and more crucial issue, the court 
explained that there was a split among the circuits as to whether 
 
8 See id. at 465. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 477. 
11 Id. at 468–71. 
12 Id. at 468–69 (noting that in Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 577 (6th Cir. 
2000), the Sixth Circuit had adopted the test for determining dilution as set out in 
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999)).  The Nabisco test requires 
five elements: “(1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the 
junior use must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark 
has become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior 
mark.” Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.  Rather than relying on the Nabisco test for dilution, the 
district court applied a four-factor test for dilution established by the Ninth Circuit in 
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). See V Secret 
Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 469.  The Panavision test requires the plaintiff to prove that 
(1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of the 
mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began after the mark became 
famous; and (4) the defendant’s use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark 
by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and 
services. 
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324. 
13 V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 469. 
14 Id. at 471. 
15 Id. at 469 (quoting Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216–17). 
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proof of actual, present injury was required to state a dilution claim 
under the FTDA.16 
The Sixth Circuit sought to resolve the two leading and directly 
contradictory cases that had addressed the requirement of actual, 
present injury.17  In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development,18 the Fourth 
Circuit required proof of actual harm to a trademark for a federal 
dilution claim.19  Ringling sought to enjoin Utah Division’s use of 
the slogan, “The Greatest Snow on Earth,”20 claiming that it 
diluted its famous trademark, “The Greatest Show on Earth.”21  
The court held that dilution under the FTDA requires “(1) a 
sufficient similarity of marks to evoke in consumers a mental 
association of the two that (2) causes (3) actual harm to the senior 
marks’ economic value as a product-identifying and advertising 
agent.”22  The court acknowledged that requiring proof of actual 
harm was more stringent than most state dilution laws, but held its 
standard to be consistent with Congress’s intent.23 
In the other leading case, the Second Circuit in Nabisco, Inc. v. 
PF Brands, Inc.,24 explicitly rejected Ringling Bros. and adopted a 
much less stringent standard.25  Pepperidge Farm brought a claim 
for dilution against Nabisco for marketing a goldfish-shaped 
cracker similar to its “orange, bite-sized, cheddar cheese-flavored, 
goldfish-shaped cracker.”26  The court held that a plaintiff could 
use circumstantial evidence to infer injury, without having to prove 
actual harm: “Plaintiffs are ordinarily free to make their case 
through circumstantial evidence that will justify an ultimate 
inference of injury.  ‘Contextual factors’ have long been used to 
 
16 V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 472. 
17 Id. 
18 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). 
19 Id. at 453. 
20 Id. at 451. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 453. 
23 Id. at 458–59.  The Fourth Circuit’s actual harm test was subsequently adopted by 
the Fifth Circuit in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 
(5th Cir. 2000). 
24 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). 
25 Id. at 223–24. 
26 Id. at 212. 
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establish infringement.  We see no reason why they should not be 
used to prove dilution.”27  The Sixth Circuit agreed with the 
Second Circuit’s analysis and adopted the Nabisco standard, thus 
permitting a mere inference of likely harm, rather than proof of 
actual harm, to sustain a federal dilution claim.28  The court then 
concluded that the Moseleys’ use of Victor’s Little Secret was “a 
classic instance of dilution by tarnishing (associating the Victoria’s 
Secret name with sex toys and lewd coffee mugs) and by blurring 
(linking the chain with a single, unauthorized establishment).”29 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to finally resolve 
“whether objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of 
a famous mark (as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from 
a subjective ‘likelihood of dilution’ standard) is a requisite for 
relief under the FTDA.”30  The Court discussed the development of 
trademark dilution law, from its original inception in a 1927 law 
review article,31 to its adoption by more than half of the states,32 to 
its incorporation in the federal law in 1996.33  It noted that, in 
1988, when major changes were being made to federal trademark 
law, an anti-dilution provision had been proposed, but was 
ultimately rejected because of concerns that “it might have applied 
 
27 Id. at 224.  “Contextual factors” include, but are not limited to, distinctiveness of the 
plaintiff’s mark, similarity of the marks, proximity of the products, shared customers and 
geographic limitations, and sophistication of consumers. See id. at 217–220. 
28 V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 475 (concluding that the Nabisco test “both tracks 
the language of the statute and follows more closely Congress’s intent in enacting the 
FTDA”). 
29 Id. at 477.  “Dilution corrodes a trademark by ‘blurring its product identification or 
by damaging positive associations that have attached to it.’” Id. at 471 (citing Panavision 
Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
30 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1118–19 (2003). 
31 Id. at 1122 (discussing Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927)).  The terms “dilution” and “anti-dilution” are 
used synonymously throughout this Article. 
32 Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123.  Massachusetts was the first state to enact an anti-
dilution statute in 1947, followed by Illinois in 1953, and New York and Georgia in 1955. 
Keren Levy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Conflict Between Constitutional and 
Intellectual Property Interests, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 425, 432 n.47 (2001).  By 1996, 
when the FTDA was passed, twenty-eight states had enacted anti-dilution statutes. Robert 
N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whitling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark 
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 811 (1997). 
33 Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123. 
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to expression protected by the First Amendment.”34  When the 
FTDA finally was passed in 1996, it included two exceptions 
designed to allay the First Amendment concern: “a provision 
allowing ‘fair use’ of a registered trademark in comparative 
advertising or promotion, and the provision that noncommercial 
use of the mark shall not constitute dilution.”35 
The Court compared most state anti-dilution statutes, which 
refer to both “‘injury to business reputation’” (tarnishment) and 
“‘dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trademark’” 
(blurring) with the FTDA, which refers to only the latter.36  The 
Court emphasized that the state statutes, as well as several other 
provisions of the federal trademark law, “repeatedly refer to a 
‘likelihood’ of harm rather than to a completed harm.”37  In 
contrast, the federal dilution statute provides that injunctive relief 
is appropriate only if a use “‘causes dilution of the distinctive 
quality’ of the famous mark.”38  The Court held that this distinction 
was dispositive.39  The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that 
the FTDA’s language “unambiguously requires a showing of 
actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution.”40 
The Court stated that proof of the consequences of dilution, 
such as actual loss of sales or profits, was not required.41  It 
discussed the Ringling Bros. case and disagreed to the extent the 
Fourth Circuit required such proof.42  The Court, however, 
endorsed one aspect of the Ringling Bros. conclusion: 
We do agree . . . with that court’s conclusion that, at least 
where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that 
consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a 
famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable 
dilution. As the facts of that case demonstrate, such mental 
association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the 
 
34 Id. at 1122; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
35 Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000). 
36 Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124. 
37 Id. 
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famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the 
statutory requirement for dilution under the FTDA.  For 
even though Utah drivers may be reminded of the circus 
when they see a license plate referring to the “greatest snow 
on earth,” it by no means follows that they will associate 
“the greatest show on earth” with skiing or snow sports, or 
associate it less strongly or exclusively with the circus.  
“Blurring” is not a necessary consequence of mental 
association.  (Nor, for that matter, is “tarnishing.”)43 
Similarly, the Court noted that a consumer who saw an 
advertisement for Victor’s Little Secret and thereafter notified 
Victoria’s Secret made a “mental association” between the two 
retailers, but did not form a different impression of Victoria’s 
Secret.44  Although the Court opined that direct evidence of 
dilution, such as consumer surveys, might not be necessary if 
actual dilution could be reliably proven through circumstantial 
evidence, the Court held that there was insufficient evidence in the 
record to support summary judgment in favor of Victoria’s Secret 
and thus reversed and remanded the case.45 
The Moseley decision will have significant ramifications for 
any claim made under the federal dilution statute.  It will be of 
particular importance in trademark parody cases, where the junior 
mark is similar, but not identical, to the senior mark.  Alleging a 
“likelihood” that a trademark parody will dilute the senior mark 
will no longer be sufficient to establish a claim under the FTDA. 
II. HISTORY OF TRADEMARK PARODY CASES 
Parody is a form of social commentary and criticism that dates 
back to ancient Greece.46  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,47 
the Court explained that the word “parody” has its root in the 
 
43 Id. at 1124–25. 
44 Id. at 1125. 
45 Id. 
46 See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(“Parody is a humorous form of social commentary and literary criticism that dates back 
as far as Greek antiquity”). 
47 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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Greek parodeia, described as “‘“a song sung alongside 
another.”’”48  The Campbell court quoted the Oxford English 
Dictionary definition of parody as a composition “‘in which the 
characteristic turns of thought and phrase in an author . . . are 
imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous.’”49  
“Chaucer, Shakespeare, Pope, Voltaire, Fielding, Hemingway and 
Faulkner are among the myriad of authors who have written 
parodies.”50  Parody is a form of expression that is clearly and 
staunchly protected by the First Amendment.51 
Trademarks are of relatively recent vintage.  While they are 
often categorized with copyrights and patents as intellectual 
property, they claim a less noble and shorter heritage.  Their origin 
lies in the Commerce Clause,52 rather than the Intellectual Property 
Clause,53 and they date back to 1870, rather than to pre-
Constitution days.54  While the purpose of the copyright and patent 
laws is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”55 the 
purpose behind the Lanham Act56 is to protect trademark owners 
and the public from unfair competition and to prevent consumer 
confusion.57 
One of the earliest protections afforded trademarks under the 
Lanham Act was from infringement—the “use in commerce . . . of 
 
48 Id. at 580 (quoting Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1440 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 768 (15th ed. 
1975)), rev’d, 510 U.S. at 569). 
49 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 n.13 (quoting 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 247 (2d 
ed. 1989)). 
50 L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 28. 
51 For an excellent discussion of the history and development of the balance between 
the First Amendment and copyright law, specifically as it pertains to parody as fair use, 
see SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F.3d 1257, 1260–65 (11th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the novel The Wind Done Gone was entitled to First Amendment 
protection as a parody of Gone With the Wind). 
52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
53 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
54 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995) (“Although several 
states had earlier enacted legislation to prevent the fraudulent use of trademarks, the first 
federal trademark statute was not enacted until 1870.”). 
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
56 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2000). 
57 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 2 cmt. e (4th ed. 2003). 
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a registered mark . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion.”58  
Not surprisingly, the focus of courts in trademark infringement 
cases is the “likelihood of confusion” caused by the allegedly 
infringing mark.  Different tests have been formulated in various 
circuits to guide courts in determining whether or not there is an 
infringement.59  Unlike copyright and patent laws, which are 
primarily federal, trademark law is a combination of both federal 
and state law.60  After the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946,61 
 
58 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
59 The Second Circuit uses the Polaroid factors to determine likelihood of confusion: 
the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the 
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the 
gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting 
its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the 
buyers. 
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also 
Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(providing a recent application of this test). 
 The Fifth Circuit uses the “digits of confusion” test, which includes a non-exhaustive 
list of factors: 
(1) the type of trademark allegedly infringed, (2) the similarity between the two 
marks, (3) the similarity of the products or services, (4) the identity of the retail 
outlets and purchasers, (5) the identity of the advertising media used, (6) the 
defendant’s intent, and (7) any evidence of actual confusion. 
Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998).  The Fifth Circuit has 
held that confusion resulting from a parody is not an affirmative defense to a trademark 
infringement claim but is instead an additional factor that should be considered. Id.; see 
also Lyons Partnership v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 388–89 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying 
this test). 
 The Eighth Circuit uses the SquirtCo factors: the strength of the trademark; the 
similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; the competitive proximity of the 
parties’ products; the defendant’s intent to confuse the public; evidence of any actual 
confusion; and the degree of care exercised by the plaintiff’s potential customers. 
SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying this test). 
 The Ninth Circuit uses the Sleekcraft factors: 
1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4. 
evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and 
the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. defendant’s intent 
in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Dr. Seuss 
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying this 
test). 
60 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 57. 
61 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1051–1127 (2000)). 
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states began enacting anti-dilution statutes.62  These state statutes 
generally protected a mark from blurring63 and tarnishment.64  In 
1996, the FTDA was enacted65 after several failed attempts to add 
anti-dilution provisions to the federal law.66  Significantly, the 
purpose behind anti-dilution laws is not to avoid consumer 
confusion, but rather, to promote a property-like interest in the 
mark itself.67  This deviation from the original purpose of 
trademark law is largely responsible for the confused state of law 
regarding trademark parodies today, as illustrated by the following 
discussion of cases from the past twenty-five years. 
A. The Early (Sex) Cases 
Four early trademark parody cases involved sex, which often 
signals defeat for the defendant parodist.68  Three of the four did, 
 
62 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
63 Blurring is the gradual loss of distinction of a mark caused by use of the mark by 
someone else. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 201 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff’d, 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 
497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 24:68. 
64 Tarnishment is the damaging of the reputation of a mark caused by use of the mark 
by someone else. See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 507 (“A trademark may be tarnished when it is 
‘linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory 
context,’ with the result that ‘the public will associate the lack of quality or lack of 
prestige in the defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated goods.’” (quoting Deere & 
Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994))); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 57, § 24:69. 
65 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). 
66 Klieger, supra note 32, at 833–34. 
67 The Supreme Court’s Moseley decision noted the unusual origin of the anti-dilution 
statutes: 
Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution 
are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an 
interest in protecting consumers.  The seminal discussion of dilution is found in 
Frank Schechter’s 1927 law review article concluding “that the preservation of 
the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its 
protection.” 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2003) (quoting Schechter, 
supra note 31, at 831). 
68 Cf. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs., LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)  (“‘When the association is essentially a harmless, clean pun, which 
merely parodies or pokes fun at the plaintiff’s mark, tarnishment is not likely.’” (quoting 
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in fact, lose.  In the first case, the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders 
(hereinafter “Cheerleaders”) sued the distributors of the film 
Debbie Does Dallas for trademark infringement and trademark 
dilution under New York law.69  The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals granted an injunction against the distributors, holding that 
the Cheerleaders’ uniform  worn (partially) by an actress during 
the last twelve minutes of the film would likely result in 
confusion.70  The court held that the film did not qualify as a 
parody, nor was there any First Amendment doctrine that would 
protect the infringement of the Cheerleaders’ trademark.71 
In the second case, General Electric (GE) sued a company that 
was selling T-shirts and briefs containing GE’s distinctive 
monogram style, but with the words “Genital Electric,” for 
trademark infringement and trademark dilution under 
Massachusetts law.72  In a short six-paragraph opinion containing 
little detailed analysis, the district court found a “great probability 
of confusion among the general public” and granted an injunction 
against the T-shirt company.73 
In the third case, after Screw magazine published a cartoon 
depicting Pillsbury’s trade characters—”Poppin Fresh” and 
“Poppie Fresh”—engaged in a variety of sexual acts, Pillsbury 
sued for, among other things, copyright infringement, trademark 
infringement, and trademark dilution under Georgia law.74  The 
court held that (1) there was no copyright infringement because 
defendant’s work was protected as a fair use,75 (2) there was no 
trademark infringement because there was no showing of a 
likelihood of confusion,76 but that (3) plaintiff was entitled under 
 
Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D.N.M. 1985), aff’d, 828 F.2d 
1482 (10th Cir. 1987))). 
69 Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202–03 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
70 Id. at 204–05. 
71 Id. at 205–06. 
72 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036, 1036 & n.1 (D. 
Mass. 1979). 
73 Id. at 1037. 
74 Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 125–26 (N.D. Ga. 
1981). 
75 Id. at 128–32. 
76 Id. at 132–34. 
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Georgia law to an injunction because there was a likelihood that 
the defendant’s work would dilute the distinctive quality of the 
plaintiff’s trademarks.77 
In the last case, after High Society magazine published a two-
page parody entitled L.L. Beam’s Back-to-School-Sex-Catalog that 
included pictures of nude models in sexually explicit positions, 
L.L. Bean sued for, among other things, trademark infringement 
and trademark dilution under Maine law.78  The district court 
denied summary judgment to both parties on the trademark 
infringement claim, finding that there were factual questions 
pertaining to the likelihood of confusion.79  It granted summary 
judgment, however, to L.L. Bean on the dilution claim, finding that 
the parody had tarnished its trademark by undermining the 
goodwill and reputation associated with its mark.80  Citing the 
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders decision, the court also held that 
enjoining the publication of the parody on dilution grounds did not 
offend the principle of free expression under the First 
Amendment.81 
The First Circuit, in a ruling that was quite different than the 
three earlier cases, reversed the district court’s finding of dilution 
and lifted the injunction against High Society.82  Tracing the 
history of parody from ancient Greece to modern day, the court 
noted the pervasive influence of trademarks on modern culture and 
observed that trademarks have become a natural target of 
satirists.83  The court noted that the “ridicule conveyed by parody 
inevitably conflicts with one of the underlying purposes of the 
Maine anti-dilution statute, which is to protect against the 
tarnishment of the goodwill and reputation associated with a 
particular trademark.”84  The court stated, however, that a 
trademark is not property in the ordinary sense, and cannot be used 
 
77 Id. at 135. 
78 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1987). 
79 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1531, 1533–35 (D. Me. 
1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987). 
80 Id. at 1536–38. 
81 Id. at 1537–38. 
82 L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34. 
83 Id. at 28. 
84 Id. 
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to quash an unauthorized use of a mark that communicates ideas or 
expresses views.85 
The court then addressed whether enjoining publication of 
defendant’s parody would violate the First Amendment guarantee 
of freedom of expression.86  It discussed a number of previous 
cases finding trademark dilution, including Dallas Cowboy 
Cheerleaders and General Electric,87 but found them 
distinguishable for two reasons: 
First, they all involved unauthorized commercial uses of 
another’s trademark. Second, none of those cases involved 
a defendant using a plaintiff’s trademark as a vehicle for an 
editorial or artistic parody.  In contrast to the cases cited, 
the instant defendant used plaintiff’s mark solely for 
noncommercial purposes. Appellant’s parody constitutes an 
editorial or artistic, rather than a commercial, use of 
plaintiff’s mark.  The article was labelled [sic] as “humor” 
and “parody” in the magazine’s table of contents.88 
The court stated that it offended the Constitution to invoke an anti-
dilution statute as a basis for enjoining the noncommercial use of a 
trademark by a defendant engaged in a protected form of 
expression.89  The First Circuit noted that parody is often 
offensive, but nevertheless “‘deserving of substantial freedom—
both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary 
criticism.’”90 
In an interesting footnote, the court distinguished the Pillsbury 
decision by noting that Pillsbury does not stand for the proposition 
that a parody may be enjoined under an anti-dilution statute.91  
Because the defendant did not assert parody as a defense to the 
 
85 See id. at 29. 
86 See id. at 30–33. 
87 See id. at 31–32. 
88 Id. at 32. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 33 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) 
(protecting the right of Mad magazine to publish parody lyrics to songs)). 
91 L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 33 n.5. 
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dilution claim (but only to the copyright infringement claim), the 
Pillsbury court did not consider the issue.92 
Lastly, the court stated that trademark parodies, even when 
offensive, did convey a message.93  It concluded that “[d]enying 
parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names which 
have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would 
constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of 
expression.”94 
The L.L. Bean case is important for a number of reasons.  First, 
one could argue that any of the parodic expressions already 
discussed and any that will follow would have been permitted as 
protected expression under the court’s analysis.  Second, the court 
recognized the problems associated with treating a trademark as a 
traditional property interest.  Third, the court acknowledged that 
parody was often offensive and unpopular, but nonetheless entitled 
to constitutional protection.  Fourth, the court characterized the 
defendant’s parodic work as “noncommercial.”95  This will 
become extremely important for cases decided under the FTDA 
because the FTDA specifically exempts the “[n]oncommercial 
use” of a mark.96 
B. Other Pre-FTDA Cases 
In the years before the FTDA’s enactment, the Second Circuit 
handed down several important decisions.  In a case that did not 
involve trademark parody, but involved freedom of expression, 
Ginger Rogers sued the distributor of a film entitled Ginger and 
Fred, alleging, among other things, that the use of her name 
violated the Lanham Act.97  The court established a balancing test: 
the Lanham Act “should be construed to apply to artistic works 
only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion 
 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 34. 
94 Id.  That message, the court added, “may simply be that business and product images 
need not always be taken too seriously . . . .” Id. 
95 See id. at 32. 
96 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000). 
97 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989). 
BLANKE FORMAT 8/27/03  11:30 AM 
2003] TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR PARODY 1067 
outweighs the public interest in free expression.”98  The court held 
that the film title contained no explicit indication that Rogers had 
any involvement with the film and did not mislead consumers into 
thinking that the film was about her and Fred Astaire.99 
Later the same year, the Second Circuit applied the Rogers 
balancing test to works of artistic expression, including parody.100  
The defendant, a well-known publishing company, partnered with 
Spy magazine to publish a parody of Cliffs Notes called Spy 
Notes.101  The cover of Spy Notes used the same distinctive yellow 
color as Cliffs Notes’ cover, with black diagonal stripes and black 
lettering.102  The front and back covers of the book, however, 
contained the phrase “A Satire” nine times, as well as other 
indications that Cliffs Notes was not the publisher.103 
The court began its analysis with the proposition that parody 
was a form of artistic expression, protected by the First 
Amendment.104  It recognized the conflict between free speech and 
trademark protection: 
A parody must convey two simultaneous—and 
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also 
that it is not the original and is instead a parody.  To the 
extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not 
only a poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark 
law, since the customer will be confused.105 
Thus, the court concluded that the issue is how to balance the 
“competing considerations of allowing artistic expression and 
 
98 Id. at 999. 
99 Id. at 1001–02. 
100 See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 
494–95 (2d Cir. 1989). 
101 Id. at 491–92. 
102 Id. at 492. 
103 Id. Among the other indications of the product’s satirical nature: “[T]he cover of Spy 
Notes states prominently in red that it ‘Includes The Spy Novel-O-Matic Fiction-Writing 
Device!’  This tool, which a prospective purchaser can inspect simply by opening Spy 
Notes, allows the ‘young, world-weary urban author’ to create ‘16,765,056 different plot 
possibilities’ by manipulating a card.” Id. 
104 Id. at 493. 
105 Id. at 494. 
BLANKE FORMAT 8/27/03  11:30 AM 
1068 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1053 
preventing consumer confusion.”106  The court extended the 
Rogers balancing test to parodies107 and concluded that while the 
parody cover of Spy Notes looked very similar to the cover design 
of Cliffs Notes, there was only a slight risk of consumer 
confusion.108  This risk of confusion, the court added, was 
outweighed by the public interest in free expression, especially in a 
form of expression that, in order to be effective, had to resemble 
the original.109 
In another case, New York magazine published a Christmas 
issue that parodied the Farmer’s Almanac (hereinafter 
“Almanac”).110  New York’s cover was a takeoff on the Almanac, 
and its content parodied the homespun, rustic nature of that in the 
Almanac.111  The publisher of the Almanac sued the magazine for 
trademark infringement and trademark dilution under New York 
law.112  The District Court for the Southern District of New York 
applied the eight-factor Polaroid test113 and concluded that the 
parody cover was clearly recognizable as a joke and did not cause 
a significant likelihood of confusion as to its source.114  The court 
stated that even if there had been some confusion, it still would not 
have found a trademark violation because of the First Amendment 
protection of expression.115  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
applied the Second Circuit’s test under Rogers to balance the dual 
interests of artistic expression and avoiding consumer confusion: 
“‘[T]he [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic 
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer 
confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression . . . .’”116 
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 494–95. 
108 Id. at 495–97. 
109 Id. at 497. 
110 Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
111 See id. at 271–72. 
112 See id. at 272. 
113 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
114 See Yankee Publ’g, 809 F. Supp. at 273–75. 
115 See id. at 275. 
116 Id. at 276 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
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In yet another case, when Hormel Foods, the maker of SPAM 
luncheon meat, learned that a character in an upcoming “Muppet” 
film was named Spa’am, it sued Jim Henson Productions for 
trademark infringement and trademark dilution, seeking to enjoin 
the release of the film and related merchandise.117  The Second 
Circuit applied the Polaroid test, and found that “the clarity of 
Henson’s parodic intent, the widespread familiarity with Henson’s 
Muppet parodies, and the strength of Hormel’s mark, all weigh[ed] 
strongly against the likelihood of confusion as to source or 
sponsorship between Hormel’s mark and the name ‘Spa’am.’”118  
The court further held that because of the strength of the mark, the 
lack of negative association, and the clear parodic intent, there was 
neither dilution by blurring nor dilution by tarnishment.119 
In addition to the Second Circuit, two other circuits also have 
decided cases giving great deference to parodies of trademarks.  In 
one case, the maker of Jordache Jeans sued the maker of a line of 
jeans that targeted larger women and carried names such as 
“Lardashe,” “Vidal Sowsoon,” and “Calvin Swine” for trademark 
infringement and trademark dilution.120  The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding that there was no likelihood of 
confusion regarding the infringement claim.121  The court held that 
intent to parody a trademark does not imply intent to confuse the 
public: “[W]here a party chooses a mark as a parody of an existing 
mark, the intent is not necessarily to confuse the public but rather 
to amuse.”122  With respect to the dilution claim, the court, citing 
the L.L. Bean decision, discussed the three grounds upon which a 
trademark owner can obtain injunctive relief: 
Relief may be granted if: “ There is a likelihood of dilution 
due to (1) injury to the value of the mark caused by actual 
or potential confusion, (2) diminution in the uniqueness and 
individuality of the mark, or (3) injury resulting from use of 
 
117 See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500–02 (2d Cir. 
1996).  On appeal to the Second Circuit, Hormel limited its challenge to the 
merchandising use. Id. at 500. 
118 Id. at 503. 
119 See id. at 506–08. 
120 See Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1483 (10th Cir. 1987). 
121 See id. 
122 Id. at 1486. 
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the mark in a manner that tarnishes or appropriates the 
goodwill and reputation associated with plaintiff’s 
mark.”123 
Regarding the first ground, the court repeated that there was no 
likelihood of confusion between the Jordache and Lardashe 
trademarks, as was found with respect to the infringement claim.124  
Concerning the second ground, the court upheld the district court’s 
ruling that since Lardashe was clearly a parody, the Jordache mark 
would not lose it distinctiveness, and that “‘indeed, parody tends to 
increase public identification of a plaintiff’s mark with the 
plaintiff.’”125  With respect to the third ground, the tarnishment 
aspect of dilution, the court noted that the “tension between the 
first amendment and trademark rights is most acute when a 
noncommercial parody is alleged to have caused tarnishment, a 
situation in which first amendment protection is greatest.”126  It 
agreed with the district court that while some people might find the 
Lardashe mark in poor taste, “‘it is not likely to create in the mind 
of consumers a particularly unwholesome, unsavory, or degrading 
association with plaintiff’s name and marks.’”127  The court 
concluded that there can be no likelihood of injury of business 
reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark “if 
the public does not associate a product bearing one trademark with 
the manufacturer of a product bearing a different trademark.”128 
The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue when Anheuser-Busch 
sued a distributor of T-shirts that bore parodies of some of its 
trademarks.129  The T-shirt at issue displayed a logo that read 
“King of Beaches” instead of “King of Beers.”130  It also replaced 
“This Bud’s for You” with “This Beach is for You,”131 as well as 
 
123 Id. at 1489 (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st 
Cir. 1987)). 
124 See id. 
125 Id. at 1490 (quoting Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd, 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 
(D.N.M. 1985), aff’d, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
126 Id. at 1490 n.7. 
127 Id. at 1490 (quoting Jordache, 625 F. Supp. at 57). 
128 Id. at 1491. 
129 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1992). 
130 Id. at 319. 
131 Id. 
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substituting “Brewed by our original process from the Choicest 
Hops, Rice and Best Barley Malt” with “Myrtle Beach contains the 
Choicest Surf, Sun and Sand.”132  The trial court jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the defendant, finding no likelihood of 
confusion, but the judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.133  The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient evidence 
to support the jury verdict: 
The statutory standard for infringement does not depend on 
how closely a fragment of a given use duplicates the 
trademark, but on whether the use in its entirety creates a 
likelihood of confusion.  In making that determination, we 
must examine the allegedly infringing use in the context in 
which it is seen by the ordinary consumer; we must look 
not only at the portion of the T-shirt that duplicates the 
Budweiser label design, but at the T-shirt as a whole as sold 
in the marketplace.134 
The court stated that a reasonable jury could have determined that 
the T-shirts were readily recognizable as parody, and that such a 
finding would have provided additional support for the jury’s 
verdict.135  The court noted that because it had already decided to 
reinstate the jury’s verdict, it was unnecessary to address 
defendant’s contention that the First Amendment provided an 
additional basis for ruling in its favor.136 
The results in the Eighth Circuit differ from those in the 
Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits.  In one Eighth Circuit case, 
graphic artist Franklyn Novak produced a design for a T-shirt that 
resembled the Mutual of Omaha “Indian head” logo.137  The T-
shirt design at issue contained a side view of a feather-bonneted, 
emaciated human head with the words “Mutant of Omaha” and 
“Nuclear Holocaust Insurance.”138  Mutual of Omaha brought suit 
 
132 Id. 
133 See id. at 318. 
134 Id. at 319. 
135 See id. at 320–21. 
136 See id. at 321 n.2. 
137 See Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 907–08 (D. Neb. 1986), 
aff’d, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987). 
138 Id. 
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to enjoin the sale of the shirts.139  The district court applied the 
SquirtCo factors140 and found that viewers of the design might 
falsely assume that Mutual of Omaha actually had endorsed the T-
shirts.141  The Eighth Circuit upheld the ruling of the district 
court.142  It feebly attempted to distinguish the case from L.L. 
Bean, stating that L.L. Bean had involved “‘editorial or artistic’ use 
of a mark ‘solely for noncommercial purposes,’” and that L.L. 
Bean had not addressed the likelihood of confusion standard.143 
A few years later, the Eighth Circuit again found in favor of the 
trademark holder in a dilution claim involving a parody.144  
Snicker, a humor magazine, published a mock advertisement of the 
fictitious product “Michelob Oily” on its back cover.145  The 
advertisement featured a number of Anheuser-Busch logos and 
trademarks amidst an oily mess in a river.146  The publisher 
claimed that the parody reflected a recent oil spill in the Gasconade 
River, a source of Anheuser-Busch’s supply water, and Anheuser-
Busch’s subsequent decision to temporarily shut down its St. Louis 
plant.147  The district court found for the defendants, finding no 
likelihood of confusion on the trademark infringement claim,148 
and no “threat of tarnishment through association” because 
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s marks occurred in an editorial 
context.149  The district court discussed the L.L. Bean and Cliff 
Notes decisions extensively and favorably.150  The Eighth Circuit 
reversed on both counts.  With respect to infringement, the court 
reviewed the SquirtCo factors,151 and found that there was a 
 
139 Id. at 906–07. 
140 See SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980). 
141 See Mut. of Omaha, 648 F. Supp. at 911. 
142 See Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 397. 
143 Id. at 403 n.9 (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st 
Cir. 1987)). 
144 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 773 (8th Cir. 1994). 
145 Id. at 771–72. 
146 Id. at 772. 
147 Id. 
148 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 814 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Mo. 
1993), rev’d, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). 
149 Id. at 799. 
150 Id. at 794–96. 
151 See SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980). 
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likelihood of confusion because there was a “distinct 
possibility . . . ‘that a superficial observer might believe that the ad 
parody was approved by Anheuser-Busch.’”152  It held that the 
First Amendment did not bar the application of the Lanham Act in 
this case because the defendant’s ad “was likely to confuse 
consumers as to its origin, sponsorship or approval.”153 
On the dilution claim, the court distinguished the case from 
L.L. Bean.154  It noted that the parody in L.L. Bean did not make 
derogatory comments about L.L. Bean’s product even though it 
contained nude models using fictitious products in sexually explicit 
manners.155  In comparison, the Snicker parody attacked the quality 
of Anheuser-Busch’s products.156  Furthermore, the court noted 
that the parody in L.L. Bean was contained inside the magazine, 
rather than on the back cover, where “the casual viewer might fail 
to appreciate its editorial purpose.”157 
Clearly, one cannot reconcile the decisions of the Second, 
Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.  If the cases from the Eighth 
Circuit had been brought before the Second, Fourth, or Tenth 
Circuits (or vice versa), the results would have been the reverse.  
This is best illustrated by the strong dissent in the Mutual of 
Omaha case: 
[T]he majority’s holding sanctions a violation of Novak’s 
first amendment rights. The T-shirts simply expressed a 
political message which irritated the officers of Mutual, 
who decided to swat this pesky fly buzzing around in their 
backyard with a sledge hammer (a federal court injunction).  
We should not be a party to this effort.158 
 
152 See Balducci, 28 F.3d at 775 (quoting Balducci, 814 F. Supp. at 797). 
153 Balducci, 28 F.3d at 776. 




158 Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987) (Heaney, J., 
dissenting). 
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C. Post-FTDA Cases Finding No Dilution 
When the FTDA was introduced in the Senate, Senator Orrin 
Hatch voiced his concerns about the First Amendment and parody 
and the proposed dilution bill: 
The proposal adequately addresses legitimate first 
amendment concerns espoused by the broadcasting industry 
and the media. The bill will not prohibit or threaten 
noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial 
and other forms of expression that are not a part of a 
commercial transaction.159 
On the House floor, Representative Carlos J. Moorhead made an 
identical statement.160 
The FTDA permits the owner of a famous mark to seek 
injunctive relief against a use that causes dilution of the distinctive 
quality of the mark.161  The owner first must prove that the mark is 
famous.162  The statute lists eight factors that a court may consider 
in making this determination.163  Certain uses of a famous mark are 
specifically exempted: 
 
159 141 CONG. REC. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
160 See 141 CONG. REC. H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Moorhead). 
161 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). 
162 See id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–(H). 
163 See id.  The eight factors are: 
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; 
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or 
services with which the mark is used; 
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; 
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is 
used; 
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of 
trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the 
injunction is sought; 
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; 
and 
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the 
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
Id. 
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(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in 
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to 
identify the competing goods or services of the owner 
of the famous mark. 
(B)  Noncommercial use of a mark. 
(C)  All forms of news reporting and news commentary.164 
A number of cases that have been decided under the FTDA 
align with the statements of Senator Hatch and Representative 
Moorhead.165  In one of several cases from the Ninth Circuit, Dr. 
Seuss sued Penguin Books to enjoin publication of a parody of the 
O.J. Simpson murder trial that adopted Dr. Seuss’s writing style 
and emulated the plot of his book, The Cat in the Hat.166  The 
district court issued an injunction on both the copyright and 
trademark infringement claims.167  With respect to the federal 
dilution claim, the district court noted that Senator Hatch defined 
the “noncommercial use” exemption168 to include “parody, satire, 
editorial and other forms of expression that are not part of a 
commercial transaction.”169  The court went on to hold that “the 
First Amendment would apply to this use of the trademarks at 
issue, and that as an expressive use, this use is exempt from the 
reach of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.”170 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction on the 
copyright and trademark infringement claims, but did not address 
the dilution claim.171  With respect to the trademark infringement 
 
164 Id. § 1125(c)(4)(A)–(C) (emphasis added). 
165 See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th Cir. 
1997); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
166 See Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1561–62 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
167 Id. at 1562 (“The finding of a strong likelihood of success on the copyright claim 
raises a presumption of irreparable harm.  This alone entitles Dr. Seuss to an injunction.  
The finding that the trademark claims present serious questions for litigation, coupled 
with the finding that the balance of hardships tips markedly in Dr. Seuss’s favor presents 
an independent ground for granting an injunction.”). 
168 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B). 
169 Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1574. 
170 Id. 
171 Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1406. 
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claim, the court held that the Ninth Circuit uses the eight-factor 
Sleekcraft test172 to analyze the likelihood of confusion.173  It held 
further that in a traditional trademark infringement case, a claim of 
parody is not a separate defense, but rather a consideration in the 
confusion analysis: 
Some parodies will constitute an infringement, some will 
not.  But the cry of “parody!” does not magically fend off 
otherwise legitimate claims of trademark infringement or 
dilution. There are confusing parodies and non-confusing 
parodies. All they have in common is an attempt at humor 
through the use of someone else’s trademark. A non-
infringing parody is merely amusing, not confusing.174 
In a recent case, Lucasfilm sued to enjoin the sale and 
distribution of an animated pornographic movie entitled Starballz, 
a takeoff on the Star Wars films and properties.175  Lucasfilm 
alleged copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and 
trademark dilution.176  The District Court for the Northern District 
of California denied the motion for injunction on all three 
counts.177  With respect to copyright infringement, it held that 
Starballz likely would be protected as a parody under copyright 
fair use.178  With respect to trademark infringement, the court 
noted that parody was not a defense, but instead was relevant to 
show that there is little likelihood of confusion.179  Because “the 
Star Wars films are so famous[,] . . . it is extremely unlikely that 
consumers would believe that Starballz is associated with Star 
Wars or Lucasfilm.”180  On the trademark dilution claim, the court 
quoted Senator Hatch’s statement and held that trademark dilution 
does not apply to the noncommercial use of the mark: “Parody is a 
 
172 See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
173 See Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1404. 
174 Id. at 1405 (citation omitted). 
175 See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). 
176 See id. 
177 See id. at 902. 
178 See id. at 901. 
179 See id. 
180 Id. 
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form of non-commercial, protected speech which is not affected by 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.”181 
After Lucasfilm, the Ninth Circuit addressed these issues again 
in a case alleging that the Danish singing group Aqua had 
committed trademark infringement and dilution by referring to 
Mattel’s Barbie trademark in the song Barbie Girl.182  With respect 
to trademark infringement, the court held that the Sleekcraft test 
“generally strikes a comfortable balance between the trademark 
owner’s property rights and the public’s expressive interests.”183  
The court recognized that a trademark sometimes becomes an 
integral part of our cultural vocabulary and takes on more than a 
mere source-identifying function.184  In such a situation, the 
trademark owner would not have the right to control every public 
use of the term.185  The only way to parody Barbie is by reference 
to the trademark itself.186  Significantly, Barbie was indeed the 
target of the parody,187 and such speech was entitled to protection 
for its expressive value. 
 
181 Id. at 900. 
182 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d  894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003). 
183 Id. at 900. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
186 See id. at 901. 
187 See id.  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), the Supreme 
Court addressed parody and fair use in the copyright context: 
For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of 
any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some 
elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in 
part, comments on that author’s works.  If, on the contrary, the commentary has 
no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which 
the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in 
working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s 
work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the 
extent of its commerciality, loom larger.  Parody needs to mimic an original to 
make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or 
collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet 
and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing. 
Id. at 580–81 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 Relying on Campbell, the 9th Circuit distinguished the Barbie case from Dr. Seuss: 
This case is therefore distinguishable from Dr. Seuss, where we held that the 
book The Cat NOT in the Hat! borrowed Dr. Seuss’s trademarks and lyrics to 
get attention rather than to mock The Cat in the Hat!  The defendant’s use of 
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The court adopted the Rogers test and acknowledged that 
literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act “unless the title has no 
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has 
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the 
source or the content of the work.”188  The court affirmed summary 
judgment for the defendant, holding that its use of the Barbie 
trademark did not infringe the plaintiff’s mark.189  First, the use of 
the trademark was clearly relevant to the expression, and second, 
there was nothing misleading as to the source of the work, nor any 
suggestion that Mattel had sponsored it.190 
With respect to trademark dilution, the court found that the 
defendant’s use of the mark was dilutive: “To be dilutive, use of 
the mark need not bring to mind the junior user alone.  The 
distinctiveness of the mark is diminished if the mark no longer 
brings to mind the senior user alone.”191  The court, however, 
carefully examined the three statutory exemptions in the FTDA.192  
It discussed that the noncommercial use exemption might, at first 
glance, seem to be at odds with the statutory requirement that the 
allegedly dilutive mark be a “commercial use in commerce.”193  
The court referred to the legislative history of the FTDA and to the 
 
the Dr. Seuss trademarks and copyrighted works had “no critical bearing on the 
substance or style of” The Cat in the Hat!, and therefore could not claim First 
Amendment protection. Dr. Seuss recognized that, where an artistic work 
targets the original and does not merely borrow another’s property to get 
attention, First Amendment interests weigh more heavily in the balance. 
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901 (citations omitted). 
 Also, in Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999), the 
Second Circuit relied extensively on Campbell in deciding a trademark parody dispute: 
The Supreme Court’s parody explication as to copyrights, set forth in the 
context of an expressive work, is relevant to trademarks, . . . especially a 
trademark parody that endeavors to promote primarily non-expressive products 
such as a competing motorcycle repair service.  Grottanelli’s mark makes no 
comment on Harley’s mark; it simply uses it somewhat humorously to promote 
his own products and services, which is not a permitted trademark parody use. 
Id. at 813 (citations omitted). 
188 Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 
1989) (footnote omitted)). 
189 Id. at 813. 
190 See id. at 902. 
191 Id. at 904. 
192 See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A)–(C) (2000). 
193 See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903–04; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
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Hatch and Moorhead statements, in particular, in order to clarify 
the intent of the language.194  It also examined language in the 
legislative history that suggested that the bill’s sponsors had 
“relied on the ‘noncommercial use’ exemption to allay First 
Amendment concerns.”195 
Thus, the key issue for the court became whether the speech 
was commercial or noncommercial.196  The court noted that 
although the boundary between the two had not been clearly 
delineated, “the ‘core notion of commercial speech’ is that it ‘does 
no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”197  If the speech 
does more than propose a commercial transaction, it is entitled to 
full First Amendment protection.198  The court held that the Barbie 
Girl song was not purely commercial speech, and was therefore 
fully protected.199  The use of the Barbie trademark in both the 
song and the song title were exempted from the FTDA as 
noncommercial uses.200 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York faced 
a similar issue and achieved the same result, but got there by a 
different route.201  Charles Atlas sued DC Comics (hereinafter 
“DC”) for, among other things, trademark infringement and 
trademark dilution over DC’s use of Atlas’s famous sand-in-the-
face-weakling-turned-hero character, “MAC.”202  DC alleged two 
basic defenses: first, that its use of the trademark character was not 
 
194 See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905–06. 
195 Id. at 906. 
196 See id. 
197 Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 
1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)).  In Hoffman, a magazine published a digitally altered 
photograph of actor Dustin Hoffman in his role in the movie Tootsie wearing a designer 
gown and shoes. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183.  The article containing the photograph 
served a clearly commercial purpose: “to draw attention to the for-profit magazine in 
which it appeared” in order to sell more copies. Id. at 1186.  The article was fully 
protected under the First Amendment, however, because it included protected expression: 
humor and comment.  As long as expressive elements are intertwined with a commercial 
purpose, the speech is not purely commercial, and therefore fully protected. See id. at 
1185. 
198 See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906. 
199 Id. at 906–07. 
200 Id. at 907. 
201 See Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
202 See id. at 331–33. 
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“in commerce,” as defined under trademark law because of the 
comic’s expressive nature, and second, that its comic parody was 
entitled to First Amendment free speech protection.203 
The court rejected the first defense, holding that the Second 
Circuit broadly interprets the “in commerce” provision of the 
Lanham Act to “reflect ‘Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits 
of its authority under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the 
Lanham Act.’”204  The court said that the appropriate standard was 
whether the challenged use was likely to cause confusion.205  With 
respect to the second defense, the court held that DC’s work was 
clearly entitled to First Amendment protection as an expressive 
work.206  The court, however, stated that this interest in free 
expression had to be weighed against the interest in avoiding 
consumer confusion.207  Thus, the court held that both of DC’s 
defenses led to the same place—the familiar Polaroid likelihood of 
confusion test.208  The court applied the test and held that the 
likelihood of confusion was slim and clearly outweighed by the 
public interest in parodic expression.209 
It is interesting that the court came to essentially the same 
conclusion as the Lucasfilms and Mattel courts, but without using 
the “noncommercial use” exemption.210  It is also interesting that 
the Second Circuit basically used the same test for both trademark 
infringement and trademark dilution, that is, the Cliffs Notes test211 
that balances the public interest in free expression against the 
public interest in avoiding confusion.212 
The same court gave great weight to the protection afforded to 
parody by the First Amendment when Tommy Hilfiger sought to 
 
203 Id. at 335. 
204 Id. at 336 (quoting United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand Am. N.Y., Inc., 
128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
205 Id. at 337. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
209 Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 337. 
210 Id. at 336–37. 
211 See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 
497 (2d Cir. 1989). 
212 See Charles Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 336–37. 
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enjoin the manufacturer of pet perfumes with names like “Tommy 
Holedigger,” “CK-9,” “Miss Claybone,” and “White 
Dalmations.”213  The court applied the Cliffs Notes balancing test 
and stated that it “‘allows greater latitude for works such as 
parodies, in which expression, and not commercial exploitation of 
another’s trademark, is the primary intent.’”214  With regard to the 
possibility of dilution by blurring, the court held that “[g]iven the 
nature of the challenged use, then, and the utter lack of evidence 
that the selling power of Hilfiger’s marks has been diminished, no 
rational trier of fact could conclude that Nature Labs’ pet perfume 
is likely to impair the identification of Hilfiger’s marks with its 
products.”215  With respect to tarnishment, the court found no 
evidence that the plaintiff’s marks would suffer negative 
association through the defendant’s use.216  Quoting from the 
Jordache decision, the court stated that “‘[w]hen the association is 
essentially a harmless, clean pun, which merely parodies or pokes 
fun at the plaintiff’s mark, tarnishment is not likely.’”217 
The Fifth Circuit has decided two cases involving trademark 
infringement and trademark dilution against claims of parody.218  
In the first case, Elvis Presley Enterprises (EPE) sued the owner of 
the “Velvet Elvis” bar, alleging trademark infringement and 
trademark dilution.219  The bar owner claimed that the use of the 
Elvis name and images were parodies.220  The district court agreed, 
finding no likelihood of confusion with respect to the infringement 
claim, and finding neither dilution by blurring nor dilution by 
tarnishment.221  The Fifth Circuit reversed on the trademark 
infringement claim and remanded the case for entry of an 
 
213 Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 412 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
214 Id. at 414 (quoting Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495). 
215 Tommy Hilfiger, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
216 Id. at 442–43. 
217 Id. at 423 (quoting Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 
(D.N.M. 1985), aff’d, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
218 See Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999); Elvis Presley Enters. 
v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998). 
219 See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 950  F. Supp. 783, 789 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev’d, 
141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998). 
220 See id. at 789. 
221 Id. at 798–800. 
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injunction.222  The court held that the appropriate standard was 
likelihood of confusion, and applied the “digits of confusion 
test.”223  The court further held that parody was not a defense, but 
rather was an additional factor that could be considered in the 
likelihood of confusion analysis.224 
Discussing Campbell’s analysis of parody, the court stated that 
“it is clear that a parody derives its need and justification to mimic 
the original from its targeting of the original for comment or 
ridicule.”225  The court found that defendant’s parody of the 
faddish bars of the sixties did not require the use of Elvis’s name 
or marks, and that defendant conceded as much.226  The court held: 
Without the necessity to use Elvis’s name, parody does not 
weigh against a likelihood of confusion in relation to EPE’s 
marks. It is simply irrelevant.  As an irrelevant factor, 
parody does not weigh against or in favor of a likelihood of 
confusion, and the district court erred in relying upon 
parody in its determination of the likelihood of 
confusion.227 
In the other Fifth Circuit case, the owner of the rights to 
“Barney” the dinosaur sued the creator of “The Famous Chicken” 
(hereinafter “Chicken”) for the latter’s use of Barney in its act.228  
The district court granted summary judgment for the Chicken’s 
creator on the trademark infringement claim,229 finding no 
likelihood of confusion, and on the trademark dilution claim, 
 
222 Elvis Presley, 141 F.3d at 191. 
223 See id. at 194.  The Fifth Circuit’s “digits of confusion” test consists of seven 
nonexclusive factors that courts should consider in assessing whether a likelihood of 
confusion exists. See id.  A court is not bound by these factors, however, and is free to 
consider other relevant factors in making its determination. Id.  The seven factors are: (1) 
the type of trademark allegedly infringed, (2) the similarity between the two marks, (3) 
the similarity of the products or services, (4) the identity of the retail outlets and 
purchasers, (5) the identity of the advertising media used, (6) the defendant’s intent, and 
(7) any evidence of actual confusion. Id. 
224 Id. at 198. 
225 Id. at 199. 
226 Id. at 200. 
227 Id. (footnote omitted). 
228 See Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 & n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1998), 
aff’d, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999). 
229 Id. at 956. 
BLANKE FORMAT 8/27/03  11:30 AM 
2003] TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR PARODY 1083 
finding no likelihood of blurring or tarnishment.230  The Fifth 
Circuit upheld the decision, but addressed only the trademark 
infringement claim in its opinion.231  Not surprisingly, it reaffirmed 
its recent holding in Elvis Presley, that the “digits of confusion” 
factors should be considered in determining if there is a likelihood 
of confusion, and that parody is not an affirmative defense, but 
rather an additional factor to be considered.232  The court clarified, 
however, that parody should be considered in conjunction with—
rather than separately from—the other “digits of confusion.”233  
The court held that the Chicken’s use of Barney was clearly 
parodic, and that the humor was about, and directed at, Barney.234  
The parodic nature of this use was appropriately considered by the 
district court in its determination that there was no likelihood of 
confusion, the court concluded.235 
D. Post-FTDA Cases Finding Dilution 
Three cases have found dilution under the FTDA.  In one of the 
first cases decided under the new statute, the District Court for the 
Northern District of California issued an injunction against the 
manufacturer and distributor of T-shirts bearing the name 
“Buttwiser.”236  The court, in a short six-paragraph decision, held 
that plaintiff had “raised serious questions with respect to whether 
defendant’s T-shirts will ‘dilute’ [the plaintiff’s] marks” and 
granted injunctive relief under the FTDA.237 
In the second case, American Dairy Queen sued New Line 
Productions to prevent use of the proposed title Dairy Queens for 
one of defendant’s films.238  The movie had nothing to do with 
Dairy Queen products, but rather was a satire about beauty 
 
230 Id. at 952–54. 
231 See Lyons, 179 F.3d at 387–90. 
232 Id. at 388–90. 
233 Id. at 390. 
234 Id. at 388. 
235 Id. at 390. 
236 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542 
(N.D. Cal. 1996). 
237 Id. at 1543. 
238 See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728 (D. 
Minn. 1998). 
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pageants in the “dairy country” of rural Minnesota.239  With 
respect to infringement, the District Court for the District of 
Minnesota found for the plaintiff, holding that it was probable that 
consumers would be confused as to the source of the film and 
would conclude that defendant had received permission or 
endorsement from plaintiff to use the mark.240 
Regarding dilution, the court noted that the FTDA exempts 
noncommercial use, but held that the proposed title was 
“predominantly commercial and marketing-oriented.”241  
Discussing the First Amendment, the court cited prior Eighth 
Circuit cases Mutual of Omaha242 and Balducci243 as precedent for 
enjoining material that included some expressive content.244  The 
court referred to the balancing test adopted in Balducci (and 
borrowed from Cliffs Notes): “‘“[I]n any case where an expressive 
work is alleged to infringe a trademark, it is appropriate to weigh 
the public interest in the expression against the public interest in 
avoiding consumer confusion.”’”245 
The court reviewed the Rogers case,246 which also had 
involved a movie title, but distinguished it on the grounds that 
Fred and Ginger evoked a reference essential to the film, whereas 
Dairy Queens bore no relationship to plaintiff’s product.247  As 
such, the court held that there were other ways for the defendant to 
name its film without restricting its expressive freedom.  The court 
concluded that 
the balance between the public’s interest in free expression 
and its interest in avoiding consumer confusion and 
 
239 Id. at 728–29. 
240 Id. at 732. 
241 Id. 
242 Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986). 
243 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). 
244 Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734. 
245 Id. (quoting Balducci, 28 F.3d at 776 (quoting Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam 
Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494–95 (2d Cir. 1989))). 
246 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989). 
247 Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734.  The movie title in Rogers was selected 
specifically to “evoke the aura of ‘Fred and Ginger’s’ artistic expression . . . referring 
directly to Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers.” Id.  In contrast, the Dairy Queens title was 
not “designed to evoke or even suggest any relationship to [plaintiff’s] trademarked name 
or any of its products.” Id. 
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trademark dilution tilts in favor of avoiding confusion and 
dilution.  An injunction here will only effect a minute 
restriction on expression, but will do much to avoid 
confusion and dilution.  Defendant’s First Amendment 
interests are fully protected.248 
Finally, in what might be the most disturbing of the cases 
enjoining the use of an alleged trademark parody under the FTDA, 
cartoonist Kieron Dwyer created a parody of Starbucks’s 
ubiquitous mermaid logo and posted it to his Web site.249  His logo 
changed the name encircling the mermaid from “Starbucks Coffee” 
to “Consumer Whore.”250  He also changed the stars to dollar 
signs, opened the mermaid’s eyes, placed a cup of coffee in one 
hand and a cell phone in the other, and gave her nipples and a 
navel ring.251  On his Web site, he advertised T-shirts, bumper 
stickers, and a comic book, all carrying the logo.252  He sold about 
200 of the T-shirts.253  Starbucks sued Dwyer for, among other 
things, copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and 
trademark dilution by tarnishment.  The District Court for the 
Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting Dwyer from posting the logo to his Web site and 
selling any items containing the logo.254  The court found against 
Starbucks on two grounds: first, on the copyright infringement 
claim because the logo was a permitted fair use as criticism and 
comment, and second, on the trademark infringement claim 
because the logo was sufficiently distinct to eliminate the 
 
248 Id. at 735.  The defendant’s film was released in 1999 under the title Drop Dead 
Gorgeous. See A Satirical Salute to America’s Version of “Gorgeous”, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 19, 1999, at 3E. 
249 See Jennifer Reese, Starbucks: Inside the Coffee Cult, FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 1996, at 
190. 
250 See Sarah M. Schlosser, The High Price of (Criticizing) Coffee: The Chilling Effect 
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act on Corporate Parody, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 937 
(2001) (citing Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Hearing at 2, Starbucks Corp. v. Dwyer, No. 00-
CV-1499 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Dwyer’s Motion]). 
251 See id. (citing Dwyer’s Motion at 2). 
252 See id. (citing Dwyer’s Motion at 2). 
253 See id. at 937 n.44. 
254 See id. at 939–40 (citing Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Starbucks, No. 00-
CV-1499, at 4 (N.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Starbucks Injunction]). 
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likelihood of confusion with Starbucks’s logo.255  Despite these 
findings, the injunction was granted because the court found the 
sale of T-shirts and bumper stickers with the logo to be a dilution 
of Starbucks’s trademark.256 
Dwyer was unable to fund an appeal for the decision and 
entered into a settlement agreement where he agreed not to post the 
logo on his Web site or sell any merchandise containing the 
logo.257  Given the Ninth Circuit’s relatively sympathetic treatment 
of defendants using trademarks for parody, it is noteworthy that 
Starbucks was decided in the Northern District of California 
because Mattel258 was from the Ninth Circuit and Lucasfilms259 
was from the Northern District itself.  Because Dwyer was unable 
to afford an appeal, however, one can only speculate as to what the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals might have decided.  
Unfortunately, this case suggests is that a large corporation like 
Starbucks can intimidate smaller defendants.260  Despite that the 
district court ruled against Starbucks on the copyright infringement 
and trademark infringement claims, Starbucks was able to force a 
settlement because of the trademark dilution claim.261 
III. TRADEMARK PARODY AFTER MOSELEY 
Moseley holds that before injunctive relief can be granted for 
dilution under the FTDA, there must be proof of actual harm, 
rather than merely a “likelihood” of harm.262  This change will 
have drastic ramifications for any trademark parody claim.  Table 
1 summarizes most of the cases discussed in this Article.  In almost 
all of the cases where the allegedly infringing or dilutive use was 
 
255 See id. at 940 (citing Starbucks Injunction at 5). 
256 See id. at 940 (citing Starbucks Injunction at 3–5). 
257 See id. at 940–41 (citing Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice due to 
Settlement, Starbucks, No. 00-CV-1499). 
258 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
259 See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). 
260 See Schlosser, supra note 250, at 941. 
261 See id. 
262 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003). 
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not permitted by the court, the result would be different under 
Moseley. 
In Pillsbury263 and Starbucks,264 for example, the courts found 
enough protected expressive content to reject copyright 
infringement claims on the basis of fair use.  Those courts also 
rejected trademark infringement claims because there was no 
likelihood of confusion.  Both courts upheld dilution claims, 
however, because of a “likelihood” of blurring or tarnishment.  
Moseley now requires proof of actual harm before injunctive relief 
can be granted under the FTDA.265 
Similarly, the General Electric and Andy’s Sportswear courts 
granted injunctions based on a “great probability”266 of confusion 
and because of “serious questions”267 about dilution.  Moseley 
requires more.  The courts in Balducci268 and Dairy Queen269 also 
upheld dilution claims upon showings of mere “likelihood”; 
however, as discussed below, other issues might still support a 
finding of dilution in those cases. 
While Moseley certainly raises the bar for the holder of a senior 
mark, it does not give carte blanche to every junior mark.  Several 
questions must still be answered favorably for the junior mark to 
be a protected parody. 
A. Is the Junior Mark a Parody? 
While this first question may seem obvious, two important 
issues are raised.  First, the junior mark must be a parody.  A mark 
cannot simply be used without any parodic intent.  For example, in 
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, the use of the trademark was 
primarily for purposes of familiarity and notoriety, with little or no 
 
263 See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 128–32 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981). 
264 See supra notes 250–257 and accompanying text. 
265 Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124. 
266 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036, 1037 (D. Mass. 
1979). 
267 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542, 
1543 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
268 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1994). 
269 See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. 
Minn. 1998). 
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attempt at parody.270  The result in that case would probably be the 
same today. 
Also, the use of the trademark must be as parody, rather than as 
satire, as described by the Supreme Court in Campbell,271 and 
subsequently by the courts in Dr. Seuss,272 Harley-Davidson,273 
and Mattel.274  For a parody to be a protected trademark, it must 
poke fun at, or comment on, the original.  That is the main reason 
why Mattel upheld the use of the “Barbie” trademark in the title 
and lyrics of the song “Barbie Girl,” and why Dairy Queen 
rejected the use of the “Dairy Queen” trademark in the movie title.  
The former poked fun at and commented on the trademark, while 
the latter did not.  Similarly, in Elvis Presley,275 the court held that 
the alleged parody was of little weight because it did not target 
Elvis Presley. 
B. Is the Junior Mark Identical or Very Similar to the Senior 
Mark? 
The Cliffs Notes court affirmed one of the basic premises of 
trademark parody: 
A parody must convey two simultaneous—and 
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also 
that it is not the original and is instead a parody. To the 
extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not 
only a poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark 
law, since the customer will be confused.276 
 
270 See Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205–
06 (2d Cir. 1979). 
271 For a brief description of Cambell’s view on copyright parody and fair use, see supra 
text accompanying note 187. 
272 See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D. 
Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997). 
273 See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999); supra 
text accompanying note 187. 
274 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002); supra text 
accompanying note 187. 
275 See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 200 (5th Cir. 1998). 
276 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
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If a junior mark is identical or very similar to a senior mark, the 
intent of the parody may be lost or so obscured as to render the use 
confusing.  For example, Michael Doughney registered the domain 
name peta.org and created a Web site called “People Eating Tasty 
Animals.”277  The organization People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA) sued Doughney for, among other things, service 
mark infringement and dilution.278  Doughney claimed parody as a 
defense.279  The court rejected this defense, finding that there was 
no suggestion of parody because the domain name itself did not 
convey the second of the two simultaneous and contradictory 
messages required: that it has no relation to PETA and it is a 
parody.280  Only after seeing the Web site might one know that it 
was not associated with PETA.281  In a situation like this, the 
alleged parody is really not a parody at all, and traditional 
trademark infringement analysis, i.e., “likelihood of confusion,” 
and trademark dilution analysis after Moseley, i.e., “actual harm,” 
would be appropriate. 
Another example of this kind of analysis is found in Dairy 
Queen. The allegedly infringing mark, the movie title Dairy 
Queens, was very similar to the original, adding only an “s” to 
it.282Because there was no protected expressive content associated 
with the title (nor in the film itself), parody provided no weight to 
the public interest side of the balancing test.283  While Moseley will 
certainly affect dilution claims, a traditional “likelihood of 
confusion” analysis will still be appropriate for infringement 
claims. 
 
277 See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 362–63 
(4th Cir. 2001). 
278 Id. at 363. 
279 Id. 
280 See id. at 366–67. 
281 See id. 
282 See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 731 (D. 
Minn 1998). 
283 See id. at 735 (demonstrating the balance between public interest and avoidance of 
public confusion with dilution tilted in favor of the latter). 
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C. Is the Use of the Mark Commercial or Noncommercial? 
The Mattel court explored in great detail the apparent 
conundrum caused by the FTDA’s requirement for a “commercial 
use in commerce,” but then exempting a “noncommercial use.”284  
The court found an explanation in the legislative history.285  
Sponsors of the FTDA in both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, in response to First Amendment concerns, stated 
that the proposed law “will not prohibit or threaten noncommercial 
expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of 
expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction.”286  The 
court held that as long as “speech is not ‘purely commercial’—that 
is, if it does more than merely propose a commercial transaction—
then it is entitled to full First Amendment protection.”287  The court 
acknowledged that the song title containing the “Barbie” trademark 
was certainly used to sell copies of the song, but that since it was 
not “purely commercial” and, therefore, entitled to full protection, 
it fell within the noncommercial use exception of the FTDA.288  
Courts in the Ninth Circuit had previously made similar findings in 
Dr. Seuss289 and Lucasfilms.290 
In L.L. Bean, a pre-FTDA case, the First Circuit held that the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark in a catalog parody was 
“solely for noncommercial purposes” and was “an editorial or 
artistic, rather than a commercial, use.”291  In Dairy Queen, 
however, the court found that the defendant’s use of its trademark 
in a movie title had a “highly commercial aspect”292 and, citing for 
 
284 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). 
285 See id. at 905–06. 
286 Id. at 905 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S919310 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch) and 141 CONG. REC. H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Moorhead)). 
287 Id. at 906. 
288 Id. at 906–907. 
289 See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D. 
Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
290 See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). 
291 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987). 
292 Am. Dairy Queen Corp v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. Minn. 
1998). 
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support a pre-FTDA, Eighth Circuit case, Mutual of Omaha,293 
found the title to be “predominantly commercial and marketing-
oriented.”294  Because the Dairy Queen decision would probably 
be upheld on other grounds anyway, it will be interesting to see 
how an Eighth Circuit court will interpret the noncommercial 
exception. 
In Starbucks, the District Court for the Northern District of 
California held that since defendant sold T-shirts and coffee mugs 
containing the trademark parody, it was a commercial use, despite 
the obvious editorial nature contained therein.295  In Lucasfilms, 
the same court examined the legislative history of the FTDA as it 
pertained to this exception and held that “[p]arody is a form of 
non-commercial, protected speech which is not affected by the 
[FTDA].”296  Thus, it appears that the Starbucks case would have a 
very different outcome today.  Even in the Eighth Circuit, there 
appears to be enough expressive content to have fallen within the 
noncommercial use exception. 
D. Is There a Likelihood of Confusion? 
While Moseley’s requirement of proof of actual harm will 
make it much more difficult to win a dilution case involving 
trademark parody, an infringement case can still succeed as long as 
it can be shown that there is a likelihood of confusion.  While most 
courts have found no likelihood of confusion where there is an 
obvious parody, a few cases warrant discussion.  General Electric 
found a “great probability of confusion” as to the use of a “Genital 
Electric” mark on T-shirts sold by the defendant.297  Mutual of 
Omaha found a likelihood of confusion as to the possible source or 
sponsorship of a “Mutant of Omaha” logo on T-shirts and coffee 
mugs.298  Balducci also found a likelihood of confusion as to the 
 
293 See Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987). 
294 Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 732. 
295 See Schlosser, supra note 250, at 937 (citing Starbucks Injunction). 
296 See Lucasfilm, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 
297 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036, 1037 (D. Mass. 
1979). 
298 See Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 403. 
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possible source or sponsorship of a mock advertisement parodying 
Anheuser-Busch’s products as “Michelob Oily.”299 
These cases illustrate two things.  First, as a district court 
recently observed, tarnishment is usually found “only in cases 
where a distinctive mark is depicted in an obviously degrading 
context, often involving a sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal 
activity.”300  And, as previously noted, where there is a “‘harmless, 
clean pun, . . . tarnishment is not likely.’”301  So, while many 
trademark parody cases involving sex or negative portrayals of a 
product have permitted such uses, to some extent this will remain 
as a wild card factor. 
Second, there appears to be room for a classic split in the 
circuits.  The General Electric case was decided in 1979 before the 
First Circuit’s rather broad pronouncement of protection for 
trademark parody in L.L. Bean, and it is likely that the result would 
be different today.  Both Mutual of Omaha and Balducci come 
from the Eighth Circuit, however, where the court seemed to 
ignore the obvious humor in the parodies, and find that there was a 
likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the 
works.  It is likely that most other courts would have found no 
likelihood of confusion.  Even after Moseley, there is nothing that 
would change the holdings in these cases.  It is quite possible for a 
court in the Eighth Circuit, or for that matter a court in any circuit 
other than those handing down strong decisions in parody cases, to 
find a likelihood of confusion regarding the source or sponsorship 
of an alleged trademark parody. 
CONCLUSION 
Moseley dramatically changes the landscape for trademark 
dilution claims under the FTDA.  Proof of actual harm, as opposed 
to mere likelihood of harm, to the senior mark is now required.  
This makes it much harder to enjoin the parodic uses of trademarks 
 
299 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 771–72 (8th Cir. 1994). 
300 Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 809 (W.D. Tenn. 2001). 
301 Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 
(D.N.M. 1985)), aff’d, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
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as long as there is an obvious parody.  Basically, the funnier the 
parody, the more likely it will be protected.  As long as the parody 
conveys the simultaneous and contradictory messages that it is the 
mark and is not the mark, it will be difficult to prevent its use 
under either dilution or infringement theories.  For dilution, it will 
be difficult to prove actual harm if there is an obvious parody.  
Similarly, the more obvious the parody, the more difficult to prove 
a likelihood of confusion. 
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